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I.

INTRODUCTION

O
W
I

n a basic level, digital data is composed of a complex succession of 1s
and 0s. As I key in this very sentence, my software accurately processes the
otherwise unreadable data into the words that I am composing. A printed
copy of my software-processed data is of course a tangible object—we speak
in terms of “hard” and “soft” copy to distinguish physical from virtual. Some
of us from earlier generations, myself included, still prefer to move from soft
to hard copy and back again, but it is impossible to function in a contemporary industrialized economy without recognizing the sheer ubiquity of digital
data. Even that small minority of the population that does not own a
smartphone or have any online presence in social media is still likely to use
email, watch television, possess a debit or credit card for financial transactions, own a passport, visit a medical professional, use public services or facilities, attend school, drive a motor vehicle, use public transport, use electricity from a grid, use running water from a connected supply, or walk in a
public space and be filmed on closed-circuit television. A twenty-first century human life isolated from electronic data is an increasing rarity.
The technicalities of the electronic composition of data and the ubiquity
of its presence in twenty-first century life does not capture the full significance of personal data. My ability to key in text is, of course, a consequence
of the development of word processing, but I also want to preserve my intellectual property in the sentences that I construct. My thought processes
that lead to the selection of keys in the construction of words is my intangible
property. Another person’s appropriation of my intellectual property without attribution constitutes plagiarism—and that is an offense in academic
circles where we rightfully expect that the work a professor or a student puts
his or her own name to is indeed his or her own—unless attribution to others’ work is duly made. My legal entitlement to the integrity of the authorship
of my self-generated data is reflective of widespread and popular acceptance
that data is more than a complex succession of 1s and 0s. And it is not the
case that intellectual property in one’s self-generated data is the full extent of
our sense of proprietorial interest. Personal data, including home address,
investment portfolio details, passport details, social security number, credit
card and personal banking details, personal health records, and so forth include the sorts of information few of us want freely available to the public.

223

International Law Studies

2018

In a recent article in The Economist, the editorial staff explores the emerging argument that people should be paid for their personal data.1 Given that
corporate entities are already prepared to pay for data supplied by technology
firms, why not cut out the intermediaries and allow individuals to sell their
own data if they choose to do so? The Cambridge Analytica debacle, which
resulted in the acquisition of the personal data of 87 million Facebook users
without the consent or knowledge of those users, has sharpened focus on
this issue.2 Even Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, has challenged researchers to quantify the economic value of personal data.3 In our digitally
connected world, personal data has become an important commodity.
II.

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND CYBER ATTACKS

Academic scholarship and popular literature tends to describe all known offensive cyber operations generically as “attacks.”4 Accordingly, legal scholars
such as Noam Lubell lament the popular misuse of the term “attack” to describe all offensive cyber operations because of the legal uncertainty that the
misuse of the term creates.5 Thus, he argues: “For the sake of legal clarity, it
would therefore be advisable to utilize a more legally neutral (at least under
the jus in bello) description and—unless intending to define an event as an
attack under LOAC—to speak of cyber operations rather than cyber attacks.”6 I agree with Lubell and I will use the term “cyber operations”
1. See What If People Were Paid for Their Data?: Advocates of “Data as Labour” Think Users
Should be Paid for Using Online Services, ECONOMIST (July 7, 2018), https://www.economist.com/the-world-if/2018/07/07/what-if-people-were-paid-for-their-data.
2. Michael Riley, Sarah Frier & Stephanie Baker, Understanding the Facebook-Cambridge
Analytica Story: Quick Take, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 9, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/understanding-the-facebook-cambridge-analytica-story-quicktake/2018/04/09/0f18d91c-3c1c-11e8-955b-7d2e19b79966_story.html.
3. What If People Were Paid for Their Data?, supra note 1.
4. A recent example of this tendency involved journalists reporting on the September
2018 cyber security breach at Facebook in which approximately 50 million users had their
individual access tokens compromised. See, e.g., Mike Isaac & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Security Breach Exposes Accounts of 50 Million Users, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/28/technology/facebook-hack-data-breach.html; see also Julia Carrie
Wong, Facebook Says Nearly 50m Users Compromised in Huge Security Breach, GUARDIAN (London) Sept. 29, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/sep/28/facebook50-million-user-accounts-security-berach.
5. Noam Lubell, Lawful Targets in Cyber Operations: Does the Principle of Distinction Apply?,
89 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 252, 258 (2013).
6. Id.
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throughout this article, unless citing another scholar or explicitly referring to
an attack regulated by international humanitarian law.
It is important for present purposes to understand the meaning of “civilian objects” and “military objectives” and the implications of these meanings for electronic data. As Lubell suggests, in regulating the conduct of
armed conflict, international humanitarian law uses “attack” as a term of art
and specifies a number of limitations.7 Additional Protocol I defines attack
as “acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.”8
In turn, international humanitarian law prohibits parties from intentionally
directing an attack against civilians or civilian property.9 The basic rule on
distinction, codified in Article 48(1) of Additional Protocol I, is that parties
to an armed conflict must “distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives.”10 This rule
is integral to international humanitarian law and manifests in the twin prohibitions that: (1) “The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack”11 and (2) “Civilian objects shall not be
the object of attack . . . .”12 The rule also manifests in the concomitant directive that “[a]ttacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives.”13
Article 52(1) of Additional Protocol I defines civilian objects as “all objects which are not military objectives” and Article 52(2) defines military objectives as “limited to those objects which by their nature location, purpose
or use make an effective contribution to military action . . . .”14 Both definitions—what a civilian object is not and what a military objective is—imply
tangibility with their mutual emphasis on objects. This implied tangibility, of
physical materiality, is made explicit in the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary on the Additional Protocols.
The English text uses the word “objects,” which means “something placed
before the eyes, or presented to the sight or other sense, an individual thing
seen, or perceived, or that may be seen or perceived; a material thing.” The
7. Id.
8. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 49(1), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
9. Id. art. 48.
10. Id.
11. Id. art. 51(2).
12. Id. art. 52(1).
13. Id. art. 52(2).
14. See id. art. 52(1)–(2).
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French text uses the word “biens,” which means, “chose tangible, susceptible d’appropriation.” It is clear that in both English and French the word
means something that is visible and tangible.15

In drafting the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Warfare,16 (Tallinn Manual 1.0) the International Group of Experts had to
grapple with the meaning of military objective and the implications of the
definition for cyber operations. It is clear that the wording of Additional
Protocol I and of the ICRC’s Commentary, particularly to Article 52(2), influenced the drafting of Tallinn Manual 1.0 on this point, and, in my view, those
sources are entirely appropriate sources of influence. While the International
Group of Experts unanimously agreed, “computers, computer networks and
other tangible components of cyber infrastructure constitute objects,”17
opinions in the group were divided on the characterization of data. The majority of experts were of the view that “an attack on data per se does not
qualify as an attack” because the intangibility of data is neither consistent
with the “ordinary meaning of the term object” nor “comports with the explanation of it in the ICRC Additional Protocols 1987 Commentary.”18 The
majority of the International Group of Experts did agree that “a cyber operation targeting data may sometimes qualify as an attack when the operation
affects the functionality of cyber infrastructure or results in other consequences that would qualify the cyber operation in question as an attack.”19
While the majority of experts did not explain what they meant by those
“other consequences,” presumably the majority would include attacks
against targets subject to special legal protection, such as hospitals, medical
personnel and medical transport vehicles, vessels and aircraft, historic monuments, works of art, places of worship, as well as dams, dikes, nuclear electrical generating stations, and other works or installations containing forces
dangerous to the civilian population.

15. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶¶ 2007–08 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski

& Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987).
16. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 1.0].
17. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS, cmt. to r. 100, ¶ 5, at 437 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN
MANUAL 2.0].
18. Id.
19. Id.
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A minority of experts took a different view of the “objectification” of
some data. These experts held:
[T]he majority position is under inclusive in the sense that failure to include
cyber operations targeting data per se in the scope of the term “attack”
would mean that even the deletion of essential civilian datasets such as social security data, tax records, and bank accounts would potentially escape
the regulatory reach of the law of armed conflict, thereby running counter
to the principle . . . that the civilian population enjoys general protection
from the effects of hostilities. For these Experts, the key factor, based on
the underlying object and purpose of Article 52 of Additional Protocol I,
is one of severity and the operation’s consequences, not the nature of harm.
Thus, they were of the view that, at a minimum, civilian data that is “essential” to the well-being of the civilian population is encompassed in the notion of civilian objects and protected as such.20

The faithful recording of differences of opinion between the majority
and the minority of the international group of experts is a recurrent and welcome feature of both Tallinn Manuals. My interest here is to identify and discuss the ramifications that flow from this particular difference of opinion. If
data is an object, the rule on distinction applies and international humanitarian law prohibits the targeting of civilian data in the context of an armed
conflict. If data does not constitute an object, the targeting of data per se is
not unlawful and the rule on distinction does not apply.
Two common intuitive responses on the importance of civilian data support the minority view. One response favors maximum protection of the
civilian population—consistent with a particular perspective on the motivation of international humanitarian law. The other response focuses on the
contemporary ubiquity and increasing sensitivity to dependence upon data.
I am not suggesting these two responses are exhaustive of reactions to the
difference of opinion among the international group of experts, nor do I
suggest that the two responses cannot coexist in the reactions of particular
scholars. I merely observe that the responses are conceptually distinct. However, it is also true that both responses are often articulated over-simplistically as respective reactions to the majority view that data is not an object.
That overly simplistic reactive tendency is the principal reason for my decision to characterize both response as “intuitive.”

20. Id. cmt. to r. 100, ¶ 6, at 437.
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At different times in the past, I have had both responses, so I readily
accept just how easy it is to entertain either position. For example, in a 2014
article co-authored with Rain Liivoja, we asked whether “the time has perhaps come to seriously consider whether an ‘object’ for the purposes of the
targeting rules in LOAC necessarily needs to have corporeal existence.”21
Tallinn Manual 1.0 was published in 2013 and the text finalized some time
before that. In the intervening years, I have speculated whether, if the International Group of Experts for Tallinn 1.0 reconvened to vote on whether an
attack on data per se would constitute an attack, the original majority position
would prevail, or whether some of the experts now would change their original position such that the minority now reflected that of a new majority.
Of course, others have noticed the lack of unanimity within the Tallinn
1.0 group of experts on this issue. Heather Harrison Dinniss22 and Kubo
Mačák,23 for example, both contributed to a symposium issue of the Israel
Law Review in which they challenged the majority Tallinn 1.0 position, albeit
on different reasoning. Michael Schmitt commented on both of their papers,24 defending the Tallinn 1.0 majority view.
Schmitt, writing on his view of the lex lata in 2012, explicitly acknowledged that international law might rapidly evolve in response to the question
of whether data constitutes an object, stating:
I will slavishly adhere to the lex lata. I have set out elsewhere my views on
where the law might be headed, but in this article, I merely comment on
the state of the law as of July 2012. Although I believe the law on the notion
of objects will evolve with some rapidity, speculation is not my purpose
here. I do realise that the majority’s interpretation of objects leads to undesirable results in the sense that it opens the door to cyber operations
against data that could have a significant negative impact on the civilian
population. However, an all-inclusive treatment of data as an object would,

21. Rain Liivoja & Tim McCormack, Law in the Virtual Battlespace: The Tallinn Manual
and the Jus in Bello, 15 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 45, 53 (2012).
22. See Heather A. Harrison Dinniss, The Nature of Objects: Targeting Networks and the
Challenge of Defining Cyber Military Objectives, 48 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 39 (2015).
23. See Kubo Mačák, Military Objectives 2.0: The Case for Interpreting Computer Data as Objects
under International Humanitarian Law, 48 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 55 (2015).
24. Michael N. Schmitt, The Nature of ‘Objects’ During Cyber Operations: A Riposte in Defence
of Interpretive and Applicative Precision, 48 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 81 (2015).
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as will be explained, be over-inclusive. Until states determine the appropriate balance, it would be precipitate to extend the meaning of objects to this
degree.25

The differing analysis and back-and-forth exchange between Harrison
Dinniss, Mačák, and Schmitt is helpful in clarifying the parameters of the
position articulated by the majority of experts. I will engage with that discussion before moving to supplementary analysis.
It is often wrongly assumed that the majority position leads inexorably
to the view that any attack on data is permissible because data is not an object. That is not an accurate reflection of the majority position. Schmitt identifies a recurrent fallacy: “critics of the majority approach sometimes conflate
the legal meaning of the term ‘attack’ as used in Rule 37 [now Rule 100] and
that of ‘object,’ the issue at hand with regard to data.”26 The International
Group of Experts unanimously agreed to the articulation of Rule 30 [now
Rule 92], as they did to all the black letter rules, on the definition of a cyber
attack: “A cyber attack is a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive,
that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or
destruction to objects.”27 Accordingly, any operation undertaken against data
with any of the aforementioned effects, the expected causing of injury or
death to persons or damage or destruction of objects, would constitute an
attack to which the rules on targeting apply. In the Commentary to Rule 92,
the Group of Experts stated:
The limitation in this Rule to operations against individuals or physical objects should not be understood as excluding cyber operations against data
(which are non-physical entities) from the ambit of the term attack. Whenever an attack on data results in the injury or death of individuals or damage
or destruction of physical objects, those individuals or objects constitute
the “object of attack” and the operation therefore qualifies as an attack.
Further, as discussed below, an operation against data upon which the
functionality of physical objects relies can sometimes constitute an attack.28

Thus, operations undertaken against data with flow-on physically damaging effects are unquestionably attacks that are subject to international humanitarian law on distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack.
25. Id. at 84.
26. Id. at 86.
27. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 17, r. 92, at 415.
28. Id. cmt. to r. 92, ¶ 6, at 416.
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Here, there is no disagreement between the majority and the minority. All
the Tallinn 1.0 experts agree unanimously on the characterization of such
operations as attacks.
Beyond those operations against data, which result in physically damaging effects, hypothetical examples help to clarify the parameters of the majority position. Mačák, for example, offered two examples to challenge the
majority position. Both examples were intended to illustrate cyber operations
designed to destroy data without physical force that States would likely consider as constituting “attacks” because of the non-physical, but nevertheless
significant, consequences of the operations. Schmitt’s view is that neither
example achieves its intended purpose. Both the examples and Schmitt’s
counter-analysis are helpful.
First, Mačák raises the example of targeting “critical data of a military
nature, such as weapons logs, timetables for the deployment of military logistics, or air traffic control information.”29 In each case, he argues that the
data itself is a legitimate military objective because it “makes an effective
contribution to the military action of one party . . . [and] its destruction
would, therefore, also offer a definite military advantage to the opposing
party.”30 Mačák asserts that States would probably accept that such data constitutes a legitimate military objective.31
Schmitt’s response is instructive. The critical question is whether data is
an object. If it is, then in all three cases the data is a military objective and
can be attacked. If data is not an object, as Schmitt asserts, “it may still be
‘targeted’ because the prohibition on attacking civilian objects does not attach.”32 The result is the same either way, as parties can legitimately target
and destroy the date, and, in Schmitt’s view, “States would be comfortable
with either approach.”33
Harrison Dinniss approaches her critique of the majority position differently, but one of her key examples is similar to Mačák’s first example. While
other commentators show concern that the rejection of data as an object
fails to protect civilian data, Harrison Dinniss instead notes that the rejection
of data as an object may lead to immunity from attack for military data:

29. Mačák, supra note 23, at 76.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Schmitt, supra note 24, at 98.
33. Id.
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To take a practical example, weapons, weapons systems and military matériel
are perhaps the epitome of a legitimate military objective. Malware that is
designed specifically to cause death, injury, destruction or damage is indisputably a weapon. Examples include Stuxnet-type code, which is intended
to cause physical destruction, or even viruses such as Wiper, which destroyed the functionality of computer systems without destroying any physical components. However, by excluding intangible objects such as code
from the interpretation of the definition offered by the majority of the Tallinn group, neither of these cyber weapons would constitute a legitimate
military objective. It cannot be correct that one can have a weapon that is
made entirely from code that does not constitute a military objective.
As the definition of civilian objects is provided in a negative form – that is,
civilian objects are all things that are not military objectives – we are left
with two main alternatives. Either a piece of code such as Stuxnet is a civilian object or, given that the problem is with the term “object” itself, it is
not covered by the definition of military objectives at all. Given that the
object and purpose of both the principle of distinction and of the Additional Protocol itself is to provide effective protection for civilians and civilian objects while enabling parties to an armed conflict to conduct effective military operations, either of those alternatives produces a manifestly
unreasonable result. In order to conduct efficient military operations
against cyber targets while minimising the harm to civilians and civilian objects, it will sometimes be necessary to conduct attacks against code rather
than the physical infrastructure on which it rests. Any modern interpretation of the law should reflect this necessity and allow for that to happen.34

Schmitt dismisses the concern as he did Mačák’s first example, noting
“[i]rrespective of the view one takes on the object issue, Stuxnet-like code is
clearly targetable in an armed conflict.”35 If data is not an object, as the Tallinn 1.0 majority asserts, then the prohibition on targeting civilian objects
does not apply and Stuxnet-like code is targetable. However, even if data is
an object, the Tallinn 1.0 minority position, Stuxnet-like code unquestionably
satisfies the Additional Protocol I Article 52(2) criteria for a legitimate military objective.36
This is an important clarification on the scope of the Tallinn 1.0 majority’s position. It is fallacious to assume that if data is not considered an object, militaries will be restricted in their freedom to target and destroy data
34. Harrison Dinniss, supra note 22, at 44–45.
35. Schmitt, supra note 24, at 103.
36. Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 52(2).
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that is being used by an adversary for military purposes. That assumption is
simply a misunderstanding of the implications flowing from the majority’s
position. I do not mean to imply here that these examples from Mačák and
Harrison Dinniss are unhelpful. In fact, Harrison Dinniss is entirely accurate
when she states, “In order to conduct efficient military operations against
cyber targets while minimising the harm to civilians and civilian objects, it
will sometimes be necessary to conduct attacks against code rather than the
physical infrastructure on which it rests.”37
The limitation with the majority position is not that military code cannot
be targeted. Rather, it is that civilian code can also be targeted. Because the
majority does not consider code an object, the law of targeting does not apply to operations directed against it. The examples provided by Mačák and
Harrison Dinniss, as well as Schmitt’s explanatory responses, all illustrate
how readily the Tallinn 1.0 majority position evokes intuitive reactions sometimes based on erroneous assumptions. Even Schmitt concedes, in relation
to the majority’s discussion of the question of tangibility versus intangibility
for targetable military objectives, that “in fairness to both of them [Mačák
and Harrison Dinniss] a more robust discussion of the issue might have
added clarity.”38
Mačák’s second example involves the targeting of essentially civilian
data, “such as electric health records held at a particular hospital.”39 He notes:
If this data were to be clandestinely erased or altered, the lives and health
of patients in the hospital would be endangered. This data does not, of
course, meet the criteria of a military objective; its destruction would rather
affect the integrity of a civilian object (the data itself) and the safety of the
civilian population (the patients in the hospital). . . . Both of these examples
share the fact that the direct consequence of the attacks considered would
be solely the destruction of data. For the Tallinn Manual [1.0], such attacks
would normally fall outside the scope of IHL unless, in addition, they were
to interfere with the functionality of the control system to an extent requiring the replacement of physical components.40

Schmitt’s response is that any such targeting of electronic health records
at a hospital would not fall outside the scope of international humanitarian
law.
37. Harrison Dinniss, supra note 22, at 45.
38. Schmitt, supra note 24, at 103.
39. Mačák, supra note 23, at 76.
40. Id. at 76–77.
232

IHL and the Targeting of Data

Vol. 94

To begin with, the operation is an attack irrespective of the targeting of the
data because of the potential foreseeable harm to patients. As the IGE [International Group of Experts] noted without dissent, the requisite consequences to qualify as an attack “include any foreseeable consequential damage, destruction, injury or death” and, accordingly, “[w]henever an attack
on data results in the injury or death of individuals . . . those individuals . .
. constitute the ‘object of attack’ and the operation qualifies as an attack.”
Further, foreseeable collateral damage of the qualifying nature would also
render the operation in question an attack. Finally, the example is inapposite because the IGE unanimously concluded in Rule 71 [now Rule 131]
that “data that form an integral part of the operations or administration of
medical units and transports must be respected and protected, and in particular may not be made the object of attack.”41

The point of Mačák’s two examples is to expose the limitations of the
Tallinn 1.0 majority’s position that data is not an object. Schmitt’s responses
to both examples demonstrate that the implications of the majority position
are slightly more nuanced than intuition might suggest. Data that might otherwise constitute a legitimate military objective can lawfully be targeted and
destroyed whether or not data is an object. Civilian health records cannot
lawfully be targeted and destroyed whether or not data is an object. The real
point of contention is the characterization of cyber operations directed
against civilian data where no physical damage occurs or is reasonably expected to occur.
Perhaps the sort of examples Mačák and others wanting to support the
Tallinn 1.0 minority position need to provide are those that involve cyber
operations directed against civilian data that result in the destruction or deletion of the data with no additional physical consequences. If data qualifies
as an object, such operations directed against civilian data would constitute
unlawful attacks. The Tallinn 1.0 minority briefly raise some possibilities,
which they offer as the basis for their disagreement with the majority position.42 Those possibilities are included in paragraph seven of the Commentary to Rule 100 of Tallinn Manual 2.0.43 The minority considered that the
exclusion of the targeting of data per se from the scope of an “attack” would
mean
41. Schmitt, supra note 24, at 98.
42. TALLINN MANUAL 1.0, supra note 16, cmt. to r. 38, ¶ 5, at 127.
43. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 17, cmt. to r. 100, ¶ 7, at 437.
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even the deletion of essential civilian datasets such as social security data,
tax records, and bank accounts would potentially escape the regulatory
reach of the law of armed conflict, thereby running counter to the principle
. . . that the civilian population enjoys general protection from the effects
of hostilities.44

These are helpful examples and I will return to them in due course. For
now, it is important to note that Schmitt concedes the normative truth of
the minority’s position if his, and the majority’s view, is incorrect.45
III.

THE INCREASING SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA AND THE DELETERIOUS
IMPACT OF CYBER OPERATIONS

It would be difficult to remain unaware of the growing sensitivities to the
significance of data and of the outrage at the increased sophistication of
cyber operations directed against it. The following relatively recent experiences are indicative of these trends and perhaps help to explain intuitive reactions to the Tallinn 1.0 majority position. I offer the following examples to
illustrate the trends that I am describing. Later, I will return to the question
of whether, if any of these examples had occurred in the context of an armed
conflict, they would have constituted an attack subject to the rules of international humanitarian law if data does indeed constitute an object.
Security breaches resulting in the exfiltration of data are commonplace.46
One particularly high-profile incident involved the unauthorized penetration
of the databases of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in
2015, which resulted in the alleged exfiltration of personal information of

44. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 17, cmt. to r. 92, ¶ 6, at 416.
45. Schmitt, supra note 24, at 97.
Since data is not an object, then on that basis it is not subject to the prohibition on attacking
civilian objects; it is instead necessary to look to the consequences of its damage or destruction to determine whether the prohibition applies. However, as I have just noted above, I
concede that if data is an object as a matter of law, the prohibition applies, albeit only if the
cyber operation in question qualifies as an attack because the data has been damaged or
destroyed.

46. According to Techopedia, data exfiltration is “the unauthorized copying, transfer
or retrieval of data from a computer or server. Data exfiltration is a malicious activity performed through various different techniques, typically by cybercriminals over the Internet
or other network. Data exfiltration is also known as data extrusion, data exportation or data
theft.” See TECHOPEDIA, TECHNOLOGY DICTIONARY: EXFILTRATION, https://www.techo
pedia.com/definition/14682/data-exfiltration (last visited Oct. 23, 2018).
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more than 22 million U.S. government employees.47 It is not alleged that any
of this data was lost or destroyed. The issue was that this vast amount of
highly sensitive personal data was unlawfully copied and that the data allegedly included not only details such as full name, date of birth, home address,
credit card details, social security numbers, tax file numbers, passport numbers, and digital fingerprint records—a level of detail that could clearly facilitate identity theft—but also entire files for national security clearance processes to authorize access to highly sensitive U.S. government information.
Anyone who has been subjected to national security screening processes in
his or her own country will appreciate just how intrusive the questioning,
and subsequent disclosure of personal information, is.
I have written elsewhere about the OPM hack, particularly the hyperbole
in the ensuing public debate about the significance of the access to and theft
of that information.48 I was surprised to read characterizations of this incident as “an act of war” or “cyber Pearl Harbor,” or that some commentators
considered it even more serious than the 9/11 attacks because of the potential threat to U.S. national security that the targeted theft of sensitive personal
information from such a large number of senior public servants constituted.49 There is no suggestion that the Obama administration characterized
the operation in these terms. On the contrary, the administration received
considerable criticism for not characterizing the operation in more severe
terms,50 even though, from the perspective of international humanitarian
law, it was correct not to do so. But an accurate legal analysis of what happened ought not to obfuscate the seriousness of the exfiltration of all that
47. Ellen Nakashima, Hacks of OPM Databases Compromised 22.1 Million People, Federal
Authorities Say, WASHINGTON POST, July 9, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/federal-eye/wp/2015/07/09/hack-of-security-clearance-system-affected-21-5-millionpeople-federal-authorities-say/.
48. See Tim McCormack, The Sony and OPM Double Whammy: International Law and Cyber
Attacks, 18 SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW 379, 379–83 (2015) (comparing the OPM hack with the Sony Corporation hack). The
Sony hack not only involved the loss of massive quantities of company data including details
of yet-to-be released movies, it also resulted in a loss of functionality of at least 2,500 computers. The OPM hack, in contrast, involved only the exfiltration of the data in question
and no loss of functionality or destruction of any hardware. See id.
49. Id. at 381–82.
50. See, e.g., Kate Sheppard, McCain Calls Sony Hack an ‘Act of War,’ HUFFINGTON POST
(Dec. 21, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/21/sonynorth-korea-war n_
6362454.html; Mike Levine, OPM Hack: Top Lawmaker Says US ‘Under Attack,’ ABC NEWS
(June 16, 2015), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/opm-hack-top-lawmaker-us-attack
/story?id=31797366.
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sensitive personal data, and the overwhelming majority of the millions of
public servants directly affected were understandably annoyed that the
breach had occurred.
Exfiltration of data, while all too commonplace, is not the end of the
“sensitivities to operations directed at data” story. Indeed, the key cybersecurity event in 2017 was the repeated deployment of “ransomware.” Here,
WannaCry and NewPetra are perhaps the most well-known and devastating
examples. Rather than the planting of malware to exfiltrate data, ransomware
typically involves the deployment of malware to encrypt data rendering it
inaccessible to its users. The malware then demands payment (usually in a
cryptocurrency) for the decryption of the data, hence the “ransomware” descriptor. The WannaCry operation gained higher public profile in Australia
because some business corporations were affected and media outlets reported extensively on the scale and speed that the malware spread. Early
estimates suggested that more than 200,000 computers in 150 countries were
impacted by the malware,51 although later reports suggested the number of
affected computers could have been as many as 300,000.52
Despite the scale and spread of the WannaCry malware, data was reaccessible on most of the affected computers within a few days because of
the rapid development and subsequent availability of software patches to
decrypt the data. It is not hard to imagine a global, collective sigh of relief
that this operation, and others like it, were not more damaging in their effects. One key reason for the relatively small amount of permanent damage
was that cybersecurity measures surrounding critical infrastructure in several
countries was sufficiently current and robust to prevent the malware’s crippling encryption. Here, I do not mean to imply that National Health Service
hospitals in the United Kingdom, where data encrypted by the malware was
rendered inaccessible for days, do not constitute critical infrastructure. The
point I am trying to make is that despite the global reach of the malware, the
damage was not as severe as it might have otherwise have been. That fact,
however, does not obviate the reality that the virulence of WannaCry and

51. See, e.g., Henry Belot & Stephanie Borys, Ransomware Attack Still Looms in Australia
as Government Warns that WannaCry Threat Not Over, ABC NEWS (May 16, 2017),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-05-15/ransomware-attack-to-hit-victims-in-australiagovernment-says/8526346.
52. See, e.g., Dustin Voltz, U.S. Blames North Korea for ‘WannaCry’ Cyber Attack, REUTERS
(Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-northkorea/u-s-blamesnorth-korea-for-wannacry-cyber-attack-idUSKBN1ED00Q.
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other ransomware contributed to a growing sensitivity to the importance of
data to daily life in most of the world.
Governments hardly need convincing of the growing significance of data
and the vulnerability of their respective societies to exponential increases in
the number of cyber operations launched every year, or in the increased sophistication and capacity of these operations to do harm. It is reasonable to
expect that growing sensitivity to the importance of data would translate into
practical measures by States, unilaterally and collectively, to reflect their increasing concerns and that any such measures might extend to clarifying or
developing international legal norms to regulate operations directed against
data. But the issue here is not increasing awareness of the significance of
personal data. The question is whether States are bound by a legal norm to
the effect that data is an object thereby making the targeting of data subject
to the rules of targeting during an armed conflict.
IV.

IS DATA AN OBJECT FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW?

The position of the ICRC in 2015 was:
There is also increasing concern about safeguarding essential civilian data.
With regard to data belonging to certain categories of objects that enjoy
specific protection under IHL, the protective rules are comprehensive. For
example, the obligation to respect and protect medical facilities must be
understood as extending to medical data belonging to those facilities. However, it would be important to clarify the extent to which civilian data that
does not benefit from such specific protection, such as social security data,
tax records, bank accounts, companies’ client files or election lists or records, is already protected by the existing general rules on the conduct of
hostilities. Deleting or tampering with such data could quickly bring government services and private businesses to a complete standstill, and could
cause more harm to civilians than the destruction of physical objects. The
conclusion that this type of operation would not be prohibited by IHL in
today’s ever more cyber-reliant world – either because deleting or tampering with such data would not constitute an attack in the sense of IHL or
because such data would not be seen as an object that would bring into
operation the prohibition of attacks on civilian objects – seems difficult to
reconcile with the object and purpose of this body of norms.53
53. International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts: Document Prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross for the 32nd International Conference of
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The difference of opinion between this articulation of the ICRC position
and the Tallinn 1.0 majority is not a vast chasm. As we have seen in relation
to Mačák’s second example discussed above, the majority position accepts
the view of the ICRC quoted above that “data belonging to certain categories
of objects . . . enjoy specific protection under IHL,” and that this data retains
that protection from attack.54
The ICRC is understandably concerned about civilian data that does not
benefit from such specific protection, such as social security data, tax records, bank accounts, companies’ client files, or election lists and records. The
ICRC is keen to clarify “the extent to which such data is already protected
by the existing general rules on the conduct of hostilities” and rightly highlights the possibility that “[d]eleting or tampering with such data could
quickly bring government services and private businesses to a complete
standstill, and could cause more harm to civilians than the destruction of
physical objects.”55 But the Tallinn 1.0 majority also acknowledged that targeting data could result in certain debilitating physical consequences. So, for
all Tallinn experts, the targeting of any such data resulting in death or serious
harm, or causing physical damage extending to loss of functionality of computers or other physical cyber infrastructure would constitute an attack to
which the rules of targeting apply.56 The difference between the ICRC and
the Tallinn 1.0 majority is the same as that between the Tallinn 1.0 majority
and minority: whether operations directed at civilian data without deleterious
physical consequences should also be subjected to the rules of targeting.
In relation to the examples above concerning the exfiltration of data
from the OPM and the encryption of data by WannaCry ransomware, it is
worth considering whether either act would constitute an attack assuming
that both operations occurred during an armed conflict and that data is considered an object when applying international humanitarian law.
Assuming the OPM hack only involved the exfiltration of data with no
loss or destruction of any of that data and no loss of functionality to the
servers on which the data was stored, unauthorized exfiltration is akin to
remote cyber espionage, that is, cyber espionage conducted outside of the
the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, 8–10 December 2015, 97 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF
THE RED CROSS 1427, 1478 (2016).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See TALLINN MANUAL 1.0, supra note 16, cmt. to r. 30, ¶ 6, at 107–08; TALLINN
MANUAL 2.0, supra note 17, r. 92, at 415 and cmt. to r. 92, ¶¶ 2–6, at 415–16.
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physical territory of the United States. It is widely accepted that cyber espionage in the context of armed conflict or in peacetime is not illegal per se.57
Even if data is considered an object, exfiltration alone does not constitute an
“attack” under the law of targeting. If, however, in the course of the penetration of the servers and the exfiltration of the data, some of the targeted
data was corrupted or deleted, then, if data is an object, the operation may
have constituted an attack subject to the law of targeting. Assuming that all
the data was of a civilian nature, which probably cannot be assumed about
the actual OPM hack given allegations of personal data for national security
clearance purposes, the attack would have violated international humanitarian law. If WannaCry or similar ransomware had been launched in the context of an armed conflict and resulted in no more damage than temporary
encryption of civilian data that was subsequently decrypted without loss of
the data, again, this act would not constitute an “attack” under the law of
targeting. If, however, in the course of malicious encryption of civilian data,
some of that data was corrupted or deleted, then the operation would have
constituted an attack and that attack would have violated international humanitarian law.
V.

CONCLUSION

At present, we lack examples from armed conflict of cyber operations targeted against civilian data without deleterious physical consequences and,
consequently, we also lack precedents for how States respond to the legal
characterization of such incidents. The lack of relevant State practice renders
how States might respond a speculative enterprise. There is undoubtedly a
growing “objectification” of data as the incidence and sophistication of cyber
operations dramatically increase. Ultimately, it will be for States to determine
whether data is an object for the purposes of the law of targeting in the context of an armed conflict. In this period of uncertainty, Schmitt is right to
observe that States may well consider it in their best interest not to clarify
the precise legal position because there may well be “situations in which a
State would want to target civilian data directly and therefore would hesitate
to embrace an interpretive approach that would render it a civilian object.”58
Perhaps the clarification will come in response to a future situation
where one party to an armed conflict deliberately targets and destroys civilian
57. Id. r. 32, at 168; r. 89, at 409.
58. Schmitt, supra note 24 at 99 (emphasis in original).
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banking records causing widespread anxiety but without causing any consequent physical damage, and the attacking State claims to have done so legitimately because data is not an object, thus rendering the rules on targeting
inapplicable. If multiple States criticized that approach, not wanting the
banking data of their own civilian population to be targeted in a future armed
conflict, we may then have the clarification that many desire.
In 2018, I would support what was the minority position in 2011. When
thinking about this issue, I fondly recall a familiar image from Tallinn, and it
is not group singing at a local restaurant to the chagrin of all Estonians at
our table, although that is certainly one image indelibly etched in my
memory. I am in the room with the International Group of Experts and
Michael Schmitt asks us to indicate our views as to whether data constitutes
an object. It is not 2011, although I am not sure how I would have voted
then. It is 2018, and I raise my hand in support of what was the minority
position. I do so on the basis that the object and purpose of international
humanitarian law is to protect the civilian population from the deleterious
consequences of armed conflict. Part of my motivation in so voting would
be a vested personal interest in not wanting my tax records, social security
information, banking details, or other personal information the subject of
targeted cyber operations if Australia becomes a party to an armed conflict
in the future. But the international humanitarian lawyer in me would assert
that personal vested interest is no basis for determining the existence of a
binding legal norm. And if I was completely honest with myself, I suspect
that there would be a quiet voice deep in the recesses of my mind asking
plaintively but insistently – are you sure Timbo?
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